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Abstract
We propose a model in which banks are exposed to the risk of contagion through
their portfolio of loans. We show that a solvency problem in one bank can be trans-
mitted to another if they lend to the same borrower. The novelty is that the channel
for the transmission involves banks’ monitoring incentives. The intensity with which
all banks monitor a common borrower is reduced when one of the banks suffers a
solvency shock. The reduced effort intensity affects the borrower’s probability of suc-
cess and creates a contagion (endogenous correlation) from the balance-sheet of the
affected bank to the balance-sheet of the other banks lending to the same borrower.
Banks hit by a solvency shock have lower incentives to monitor borrowers because less
is left after paying depositors. Banks not hit by a solvency shock face borrowers’ risks
entirely on their own, which increases the expected cost of lending. As a consequence,
they respond by reducing the monitoring intensity for the common borrower. Bank
equity can mitigate the risk of contagion.
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1 Introduction
Since the global financial crises of 2008-2009, the view that the intertwined structure of
financial markets plays a central role in propagating financial problems has become con-
ventional wisdom and has motivated policy reforms. An example of a recent policy change
motivated by this perspective is the provision of ”single counter-party exposure limits” in
the Dodd-Frank Act, which attempts to prevent distress at an institution from spreading
to the rest of the system by limiting each firm’s exposure to any single counter-party.
Although recent contributions have shed light on certain sources of financial contagion,
the mechanism through which these problems spill over remains, at best, imperfectly un-
derstood (e.g., Allen and Carletti, 2013).
Solvency problems can be transmitted from one institution to another through common
asset exposures. Existing literature has provided three different explanations for this:
fire sales (Cifuentes et al., 2005), common shocks (Wagner, 2010 and Ibragimov et al.,
2011), and roll-over risk (Allen et al., 2012 and Oh, 2013). In this paper, we focus on
an alternative explanation: banks’ monitoring incentives. We analyze whether banks
are exposed to systemic risk through their portfolio of loans. Our approach is based on
the observation that lending to a common borrower not only allows banks to share the
borrower’s risk, but also affects banks’ incentives to monitor the borrower.
The contribution of this paper is to show a new channel for the transmission of a
solvency problem from one bank to another, which involves the banks’ incentive to monitor
common borrowers. In this economy, banks monitor borrowers in order to increase the
project’s success probability. The monitoring activity is costly for banks and unobservable,
hence generating a moral hazard problem. A solvency shock to one bank undermines all
banks’ monitoring incentives. In other words, systemic risk not only arises exogenously
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from banks’ exposures to common borrowers but also evolves endogenously, through an
incentive channel.
Our theory may be applied to study the syndicated loan market, where syndicates
often have multiple lead banks that are involved in the active monitoring of the borrower.
Alternatively, our theory is also relevant for the case when a single firm maintains multiple
borrowing relationships with different banks (Ongena and Smith, 2000). Recent empirical
literature (e.g., Cai et al., 2018 finds that banks interconnected through loan portfolios in
the syndicated loan market contribute more to systemic risk; see also Li and Perez-Saiz,
2018). Our results, therefore, provide theoretical elements to better understand these
empirical findings.
We present a model in which there are two identical banks. Each bank holds an ongoing
investment and one unit of cash as its unique assets. The ongoing investment is risky, and
at an interim date, everyone observes a signal regarding its state. When the signal is good,
the ongoing investment is successful, whereas a poor signal represents a solvency shock
for the bank and implies that the ongoing investment is worthless. Both banks use the
unit of cash to finance a common borrower’s project. The project may face a liquidity
shock before its completion. If the liquidity shock occurs, the project needs an additional
injection of funds; otherwise, it is inefficiently liquidated. Only banks with good ongoing
investments are able to raise funds to rescue the project from liquidation.
We compare the probability of project success in two different situations: when both
banks have good ongoing investments (benchmark) and when one of the banks has suf-
fered a solvency shock. We show that the intensity with which each bank monitors the
common borrower is reduced when one of the banks suffers a solvency shock, relative to
the benchmark. The bank that has suffered the solvency shock has lower incentives to
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monitor the borrower because less is left after paying depositors. The healthy bank, on
the other hand, faces the borrower’s liquidity risk entirely on its own, which increases
the expected cost of lending. As a consequence, it responds by reducing the monitoring
intensity for the common borrower.
Equity plays a special role in our model. In addition to the standard effect that bank
equity leads to an increase in monitoring incentives (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997), it
also mitigates the risk of contagion (similar to the results in Morrison and Walther, 2017
and Agenor, 2018, though different channels). In our framework, a well-capitalized bank is
less affected by a solvency shock to a connected bank, relative to a poorly-capitalized bank.
The intuition for this result is as follows: for a bank, both its level of equity and health
of the other bank, improve its monitoring incentives. Since the monitoring cost is convex,
the marginal effect of the other bank’s health on the bank’s incentives is decreasing in the
level bank monitoring and hence, higher levels of bank equity. For a sufficiently high level
of bank equity, the other bank’s health does not affect a bank’s monitoring incentives.
Our results have a number of additional implications. First empirical, banks monitor
the borrowers they share with healthy banks more intensely than the borrowers they share
with weak banks. This finding implies that the rate of non-performing loans in a single
bank should vary across borrowers, depending on the state of other banks funding these
borrowers. To the best of our knowledge, this prediction has not been tested yet.
Second regulatory, the results show that multiple-bank lending is a source of contagion
across banks. Possible actions could be a more stringent supervision of banks sharing
borrowers with weak financial institutions, or higher regulatory provisions for loans granted
to borrowers who are shared with weak banks. Choi (2014) shows that heterogeneity across
banks is important for regulation of contagion; stronger banks should be supported earlier,
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as this will improve the overall system stability more. We show that heterogeneity may
also be relevant at a more granular level: different loans originated by the same lender
will be differently affected, depending on the co-lenders for each loan.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
related literature. In section 3, we present the set-up of the model. Section 4 contains the
derivation of the equilibrium and the main results. Section 5 discusses the implications of
the model. Section 6 concludes. Proofs of the main results are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the literature in financial contagion. Pioneering works by Allen
and Gale (2000) and Freixas et al. (2000) analyze financial contagion as a function of the
structure of interbank liabilities. They suggest that a more interconnected architecture
enhances the resilience of the system to the insolvency of any individual bank. The intu-
ition is that in a more densely interconnected financial network, the losses of a distressed
bank are divided among more creditors, thereby reducing the impact of negative shocks
to the individual institution on the rest of the system.
Others focus on network externalities created from individual bank risk. For instance,
Babus (2015) proposes a model where banks share the risk that the failure of one bank
propagates to the entire system. Castiglionesi and Navarro (2016) show that an agency
problem between bank shareholders and debtholders leads to fragile financial networks.
According to Zawadowski (2013) banks that are connected within a network of hedging
contracts fail to internalize the negative effect of their own failure. More recently, Ace-
moglu et al. (2015) show that the extent of financial contagion exhibits a form of phase
transition. They find that when negative shocks affecting financial institutions are suf-
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ficiently small, a more densely connected financial network enhances financial stability;
however, beyond a certain point, dense connections work as a mechanism of contagion.
Whereas all of these papers rely on a domino effect as the source of contagion, this paper
focuses on common asset exposure as a source of systemic risk.
Common asset exposure as a channel of contagion has also been addressed by the liter-
ature in financial contagion. Banks may (privately) optimally choose to make correlated
investments for several reasons: it may be due to government distortions (e.g., Acharya
and Yorulmazer, 2007, Farhi and Tirole, 2012 and Horvath and Wagner, 2017), or in or-
der to sharpen incentives by exposing themselves to fire sale risk (Morrison and Walther,
2017). Wagner (2010) and Ibragimov et al. (2011) find that diversification through risk
sharing among banks is beneficial for individual institutions, but it increases the likelihood
of systemic problems as portfolios become more similar. The common asset exposure lit-
erature focuses on contagion through asset sales or roll-over risk. Cifuentes et al. (2005)
show that when banks are connected via portfolio holdings, a shock to one bank can spread
to the other banks through changes in asset prices, which is only possible in traded assets.
Allen et al. (2012) find that when investors observe a bad signal regarding the solvency
of an interconnected banking system and cannot identify the situation in their own bank,
they may not roll-over the debt. Similar to this strand of the literature, the present paper
also considers the possibility of contagion arising from common asset exposures. However,
in contrast to these papers, we focus on non-traded assets (loans) rather than traded ones.
More specifically, we focus on common borrower exposures and the channel of contagion
is monitoring incentives of banks.
Several theories study the informational nature of contagion, where news regarding one
firm reveals information about another, leading to correlated risks (see e.g., Manz, 2010
and Oh, 2013). In contrast to these studies, we present a moral hazard framework in
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which contagion adversely affects monitoring incentives.
Our paper adds to the emerging literature that highlights the importance of feedback
from the real sector as the source of systemic risk in banks. When lenders share common
counter-parties (Li and Perez-Saiz, 2018) or when bank loan portfolios are diversified (Silva
et al., 2017, Silva et al., 2018), the system becomes vulnerable to systemic risk. Our model
also relies on feedback from the borrower. Different from these papers, we highlight bank
monitoring incentives as the channel for transmission of the risk.
This paper also contributes to the literature in multiple-bank lending. This literature
shows that banks co-lending to borrowers introduces frictions. Parlour and Rajan (2001),
Attar et al. (2018), and Bennardo et al. (2015) find that multiple-bank lending leads to
credit rationing and higher interest rates. Carletti et al. (2007) consider the free-riding
problem that arises when there are several banks monitoring the same borrower. They
find that the attractiveness of sharing lending decreases with the amount of bank equity
and increases with the cost of monitoring. Our paper contributes to this literature by
highlighting a new dark side of multiple-bank lending. Namely, multiple-bank lending
induces contagion across financial institutions.
3 Model
We consider an economy with two banks financing a common project and a continuum of
identical external investors, who we call depositors; all agents are risk neutral.
Banks are ex-ante identical and indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}. Each bank has an ongoing risky
investment, I (similar to the legacy loans of Bahaj and Malherbe, 2018), and one unit
of cash derived from previous operations. At maturity, the ongoing investment delivers
a risky payoff. However, at an interim date, everybody observes a perfectly informative
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signal, si ∈ {g, b}, which reveals the state of the ongoing investment of each bank. When
si = g, the bank i’s ongoing investment payoff is rII at maturity, and when si = b, the
ongoing investment payoff is 0.
Each bank uses the unit of cash to grant a loan to a common penniless borrower who
owns a project requiring an upfront investment normalized to 2. The return of the loan is
equal to R per unit of investment if the project succeeds, or 0 if it fails. The distribution of
such return is affected by banks’ monitoring decisions. Each bank chooses the monitoring
intensity with which it inspects the borrower’s project, mi ∈ [0, 1]. This choice is not
observable. Banks choose the monitoring intensity simultaneously and, given the non-
observability of their effort, also non-cooperatively.
The borrower’s success probability is increasing in the banks’ monitoring efforts. This
is a standard assumption in the literature (see Diamond, 1984 for a theoretical treatment
and James, 1987 and Lummer and McConnell, 1989 for supporting empirical evidence).
The idea is that bank monitoring adds value to borrowers as it resolves agency issues
arising between borrowers and lenders.1 Moreover, banks’ efforts are interrelated in the
impact on the success probability of the entrepreneur’s project. We represent the total






This specification of the monitoring function implies that it is increasing and concave in
both arguments.
Monitoring is costly for banks. We model the cost of monitoring as an increasing and
1For simplicity, we assume that the effect of bank monitoring on borrowers is homogenous; however, it
should be noted that heterogeneity may arise across borrowers (see e.g., Diamond, 1991 and Chemmanur
and Fulghieri, 1994).
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convex function of the monitoring intensity:
cm2i
2 . Convexity reflects increasing difficulty
for the bank to find out more and more about a project.
Similar to Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), we consider that, at an interim date, the
project may face a liquidity shock with some probability, λ. If the liquidity shock occurs,
continuation can only happen if additional funds, L, are injected into the project; other-
wise, the project loses its value. We assume that the expected cost of the liquidity shock,
λL, is sufficiently small for bank lending to remain profitable, even if the risk of the shock
is taken into account.
A1: πR− 1− λL > 0
Additionally, it is assumed that the liquidity shock is sufficiently small such that it is
always positive NPV to provide liquidity to the borrower if the shock occurs:
A2: πR− L > 0
If a bank fails to cover its share of the liquidity needs, it loses its claim to repayment
from the borrower, even if the other bank covers the entire liquidity need by itself.
Banks’ assets are funded by a combination of equity, E, and debt raised from depositors
with the face value, D. Depositors are deep-pocketed investors, without the ability to
directly invest in a portfolio of loans and without other investment opportunities. They
could provide outside financing to each bank or invest in an alternative project with a rate
of return normalized to 1. We assume that the face value of each bank’s debt D is larger
than the payoff that each bank receives from the common borrower’s project, R:
A3: 1 < R < D
This assumption implies that none of the banks can fully repay initial depositors with
the proceeds of the loan granted to the common borrower. What we have in mind with
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this assumption is that the size of the common borrower loan is small, compared to the
size of the existing liabilities of the bank.
Timing. There are five dates, t = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. At t=0, each bank jointly invests its
unit of cash in the borrower’s project. At t = 1, there is a signal, si, regarding the quality
of each bank’s ongoing investment. This signal is observed by all participants, and it
perfectly reveals whether the ongoing investment is good or bad, si ∈ {g, b}. At t = 2,
each bank simultaneously decides the monitoring intensity with which it will monitor
the entrepreneur’s project, mi. At t = 3, with probability λ, the entrepreneur’s project
faces a liquidity shock. If banks cover the liquidity shortage, the returns are realized and
distributed at t = 4; otherwise, the project ends at this date with a zero liquidation value.
Deposit contracts and the ongoing projects mature at the end of t = 4. Figure 1 illustrates
this timing.
4 Equilibrium
We look for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and solve for the equilibrium backwards.
First, we analyze whether or not a bank is able and willing to raise funds at t = 3 in order to
meet the liquidity needs of the borrower. Then, we derive each bank’s choice of monitoring
effort at t = 2.
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4.1 Deposit market at t = 3
In this section, we consider the case when the borrower suffers a liquidity shock, and
the banks will need to raise new deposits to fund the borrower’s liquidity needs. The
amount of deposits that a bank needs to raise depends on whether or not the other bank
is contributing to the liquidity needs of the borrower. For tractability, we focus on the
symmetric equilibrium, i.e., conditional on being in the same state of the world (good
state or bad state), each bank equally contributes to the borrower’s liquidity needs. If,
however, one bank is in the good state, and the other in the bad state, asymmetries may
arise. In other words, the level of new deposits that bank i needs to raise depends on the
state of the other bank i
′
: when si′= g, Li = L/2, and when si′= b, Li = L.
We denote the minimum interest rate at which new depositors will supply funds as rL
s,
while the maximum interest rate that the bank is willing to pay for the new deposits is
denoted as rL
d. The bank raises new deposits in equilibrium if rL
s ≤ rLd. The equilibrium
is characterised as {Li, rL}, where Li is the bank’s share of the borrower’s liquidity need,
and rL = rL
s is endogenously determined. 2 As Li is pre-determined by t = 3 (it depends
on the state each bank is in, which is revealed at t = 1), we only solve for rL at t = 3, to
fully characterize the equilibrium.
4.1.1 Supply of deposits
At t = 3, the bank’s ability to raise new deposits depends on its own state:
• If the signal of the ongoing investment of bank i is si = b:
Then with probability π, the new project succeeds and produces R. Given Assump-
tion A3, R is insufficient to repay both existing and new depositors, in full. In
2Since depositors are deep-pocket investors without opportunity cost, they will deposit in the bank as
long as they do not have negative expected return.
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this case, new depositors receive their pro-rata share, LiD+LiR. With complementary
probability (1 − π), the new project fails, and the bank fully defaults on all of its
deposits. Therefore, the expected payoff of the new depositor is π LiD+LiR − Li < 0.
In other words, when the signal of the ongoing investment is bad (si = b), time 3
depositors’ expected payoff is negative. This implies that even if the bank is willing,
it will not be able to raise the deposits to cover the borrower’s liquidity needs. This
situation is similar to the Myers (1977) debt overhang problem. When a bank suffers
a solvency shock, its pre-existing debt prevents it from raising new debt at t = 3.
One may argue that the bank may overcome the overhang problem by giving seniority
to the new debt raised at t = 3 over pre-existing deposits. However, anticipating
this, all pre-existing deposit contracts will include covenants protecting seniority
over future deposits raised by banks. This is also in line with what we observe in
practice. In the US and many other countries, legislation (the so-called ’depositor
preference’) prevents issuing securities which are senior to deposits.
• If the signal of the ongoing investment of bank i is si = g:
Then with probability π, the project succeeds, and bank i’s time 3 depositors will
be fully repaid at the promised repayment rate (say rL). With complementary
probability 1 − π, the entrepreneur’s project fails, and (all) depositors are repaid
using only the proceeds of the ongoing investment, rII. We consider two different
cases: i) 1I = 1: rII ≥ D+Li, the proceeds of the ongoing investment are sufficient
to fully repay all deposits (deposits are riskless); ii) 1I = 0: rII < D + Li, the
proceeds of the ongoing investment are not sufficient to fully repay all deposits (risky
deposits). In the latter case, the return from the bank’s ongoing project is divided
among the existing and new depositors; new depositors receive a pro-rata share,
Li
D+Li
rII. Given the above considerations, the expected payoff for t = 3 depositors
12












where π is the aggregated monitoring function valued at (m1,m2), rL is the interest
rate promised to time 3 depositors, and 1I is an indicator function taking the value,
1, when rII ≥ D + Li.
Since depositors are willing to invest new funds in the bank as long as they make
non-negative profit in expectation, the minimum interest rate at which they will
provide funds can be derived by setting Equation 2 equals to zero.
– 1I = 1: Deposits are riskless and depositors provide the funds, regardless of the
size of the liquidity needs. The minimum interest rate that depositors require
at t = 3, rsL, is equal to the opportunity cost of the depositors, i.e., r
s
L = 1.
– 1I = 0: Deposits are risky. The minimum interest rate that depositors require
at t = 3 is:
rsL =
D + Li − (1− π)rII
π(D + Li)
Clearly, in this case, rsL > 1. Additionally, note that the deposit rate, r
s
L, is







Lemma 1 Depositors are willing to provide funds to bank i at t = 3 only if the signal for






1 if rII ≥ D + Li
D+Li−(1−π)rII
π(D+Li)
if rII < D + Li
(4)
4.1.2 Demand for deposits
At t = 3, bank i is willing to raise deposits and provide liquidity to the borrower if its
expected payoff is higher than or equal to the expected payoff when it does not provide
liquidity. We consider below the bank’s incentives to raise new deposits in its two possible
states:
• If the signal of the ongoing investment of bank i is si = b:
The bank is indifferent between raising new deposits or not. In this case, if the bank
does not raise new deposits and fails to provide liquidity to the borrower, then its
payoff is 0. On the other hand, if it raises new deposits, and the borrower’s loan is
rolled over, the bank defaults, as the payoff from the project is insufficient to meet
all of the bank’s liabilities (due to Assumption, A3 ). Therefore, whether or not the
bank raises new deposits, its payoff is 0.
• If the signal of the ongoing investment of bank i is si = g:
Raising deposits at t = 3 will be an optimal strategy, if and only if,
π
[
R+ rII −D− rLLi
]
+ (1− π) max
{







The LHS is the expected payoff of the bank if it provides liquidity to the borrower.
As si = g, the ongoing project yields rII. With probability π, the new project
succeeds and yields a return, R. The total liability is D+ rLLi. On the other hand,
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with probability (1 − π), the new project fails. Note that the bank is protected by
limited liability. The RHS is the expected payoff if the bank does not raise new
deposits at t = 3, and consequently, the new borrower’s project fails.
According to Equation 5, we consider three situations in order to derive the maxi-
mum interest rate that bank i is willing to pay to time 3 depositors:
– rII > D+ rLLi, the proceeds of the ongoing investment are sufficient to cover
existing and new deposits. By using this inequality in Equation 5, raising




Substituting the above inequality in rII > D + rLLi, the relevant parameter
space is rewritten as: rII > D + πR.
– D < rII < D + rLLi, the proceeds of the ongoing investment are sufficient to
cover existing deposits, but not the sum of the new and existing deposits: in
this case, deposits are risky. By using this inequality in Equation 5, raising
deposits at t = 3 is an optimal strategy for bank i if:
rL ≤
πR− (1− π)(rII −D)
πLi
Substituting the above inequality in D < rII < D+ rLLi, the relevant param-
eter space is rewritten as: D < rII < D +
πR−(1−π)(rII−D)
π .
– rII < D, the proceeds of the ongoing investment are insufficient to cover
existing deposits: in this case, deposits are risky. By using this inequality in
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Equation 5, raising deposits at t = 3 is an optimal strategy for bank i, if:
rL ≤
R− (D − rII)
Li
Lemma 2 Bank i is willing to raise deposits at t = 3 only if the signal for the ongoing
investment is good (si = g). In this case, the deposit rate that the bank is prepared to






if rII > D + πR
πR−(1−π)(rII−D)
πLi
if D < rII ≤ D + πR−(1−π)(rII−D)π
R−(D−rII)
Li
if rII ≤ D,
(6)
and it equals 0; when the signal of the ongoing investment is bad, si = b.
4.1.3 Equilibrium in the market for deposits
We know from Lemma 1 that when the signal of the ongoing investment is bad, the bank
will not be able to raise new deposits. If the signal is good, the bank is able to raise
deposits, as long as the interest rate paid to depositors is high enough (rL
s is sufficiently
high). On the other hand, we know from Lemma 2 that when the signal of the ongoing
investment is good, a bank is willing to raise deposits, as long as the promised repayment
is not too high (rL
d is sufficiently low). For any given parameter values, a bank raises
new deposits if the minimum interest rate required by depositors, rL
s, is lower than the
maximum interest rate at which the bank is willing to raise deposits, rL
d. Using Equations
4 and 6, we get:
• If D + Li < rII, deposits are riskless and rLs = 1. As we assume that providing
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liquidity to the borrower is positive NPV, we have πRLi > 1 (i.e., the demand condition
is satisfied for rL
d = 1). Therefore, bank i covers the borrower’s liquidity needs, and
the loan rate is set as rL = 1.
• If D < rII ≤ D + rLLi, deposits are risky and rL > 1. Bank i will cover the
borrower’s liquidity needs if:
R >
Li(πD + Li) + (1− π)D(rII −D)
π(D + Li)
• If rII ≤ D, deposits are risky and rL > 1. Bank i will cover the borrower’s liquidity
needs if:
R >
(Li + πD)(D + Li − rII)
π(D + Li)
This implies that the bank will raise deposits and cover its share of the borrower’s
liquidity needs, if the size of the liquidity shock is sufficiently small compared to the
return of the on-going investment.
4.2 Monitoring incentives at t=2
For the remainder of the text, we focus on the situation where the size of the liquidity
shock L is such that a bank is willing to inject liquidity when the borrower suffers a
liquidity shock. We show that in this parameter space, a solvency shock to one bank may
spread to the other.
We derive the optimal level of monitoring intensity at t = 2. In order to simplify
the notation and without a loss of generality, we focus our attention on bank 1. Here
on, we drop index i from the parameters of the model. Consider the case when the
borrower needs a liquidity injection at t = 3. Bank 1 is able to raise deposits to meet
17
liquidity needs only if s1 = g. If s2 = g, bank 1 contributes
L
2 , and its expected payoff
is π
(
rII + R − (D + rLL/2)
)
− cm21. If, however, s2 = b, bank 1 contributes L at t = 3,
and its expected payoff is π
(
rII +R− (D+ rLL)
)
− cm21. Note that the deposit rate, rL,
depends on the level of deposits and rL(L/2) < rL(L). Finally, if bank 1 suffers a solvency
shock, i.e., s1 = b, it fails to raise new deposits due to the debt overhang, and its payoff is
−cm21. Bank 1’s expected payoff at t = 2, denoted as V 21 , is summarized below:
V 21 (s1, s2) =

π[rII +R− (D + λrL(L/2)L/2)]−
cm21
2 if s1 = g and s2 = g
π[rII +R− (D + λrL(L)L)]−
cm21




2 if s1 = b
(7)
Next, we derive the optimal level of monitoring in two cases: when both banks have
good ongoing investments, i.e., si = g for all i (the benchmark case), and when bank 2
suffers a negative shock to its ongoing investment i.e., s1 = g and s2 = b (the contagion
case).
4.2.1 Benchmark: The case without solvency shocks
In order to derive the optimal monitoring intensity in a scenario without solvency shocks,
we focus on the first line of Equation (7). Bank 1’s first order condition with respect to
the level of monitoring intensity is given by the following equation:
πm1 [rII +R− (D + λrL(L/2)L/2)]− cm1 = 0 (8)
Therefore, the second best level of monitoring intensity of bank 1, when neither bank
has suffered a solvency shock, m∗benchmark1 , is implicitly given by the solution to Equation
18
(8). An analog equation can be derived for bank 2. The equilibrium level of monitoring
depends on the size of possible the liquidity shock L.
Proposition 1: The optimal individual level of monitoring intensity when none of the banks







where α = rII +R− (D + λrL(L/2)L/2).
4.2.2 Contagion: Solvency shock to bank 2
We define contagion as a scenario in which a solvency shock to one bank affects the other
bank’s incentives and the average quality of its loans. Hence, in this model, there is
contagion if a shock to, say bank 2, affects bank 1’s incentives and the project’s success
probability.
In order to derive the optimal monitoring intensity in a scenario with a solvency shock
to bank 2, we focus on the second line of Equation (7). The first order condition with
respect to monitoring intensity of bank 1 is:
πm1 [rII +R− (D + λrL(L)L)]− cm1 = 0 (10)
The equilibrium level of monitoring of bank 1, m∗shock1 , is implicitly given by Equation
(10). As discussed above, bank 2’s equilibrium level of monitoring, m∗shock2 , is equal to 0.
Proposition 2: The optimal individual level of monitoring intensity, when only one of the
banks has experienced a solvency shock, is equal to 0 for the bank that experienced the
19










= rII +R− (D + λrL(L)L).
4.2.3 Comparison
Next, we compare the individual monitoring intensities under the two scenarios described
above, and we summarize the result in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Individual monitoring intensities are lower for both banks when one of the
banks has experienced a solvency shock, i.e., m∗benchmarki ≥ mi∗shock for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. See the appendix.
According to Proposition 3, not only the bank which suffers the solvency shock has lower
incentives to monitor the borrower, but also the other bank. The reasons, however, differ
for each bank. The bank that has suffered the solvency shock will get a negative payoff
if it exerts a non-zero level of effort. In other words, monitoring will not be rewarded.
By contrast, the other bank will monitor less because it no longer shares the borrower’s
liquidity risk. If the entrepreneur’s project suffers a liquidity shock, the solvent bank has
to meet the borrower’s entire liquidity need on its own. This imposes an extra cost for the
solvent bank, which reacts by reducing its monitoring intensity. Therefore, as a corollary
of Proposition 3 we can state the following result.
Corollary 1: The aggregate equilibrium level of monitoring intensity, and hence, the suc-
cess probability of the project is lower when one of the banks has experienced a solvency
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shock, i.e., π∗benchmark ≥ π∗shock for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 make up the formal statement of our main result. The
aggregate level of monitoring, and therefore, the project’s success probability is lower when
one of the banks has experienced a solvency shock. This implies that a bank will see a
reduction in its average portfolio quality as a consequence of a solvency shock suffered by
another bank with whom it shares borrowers.
4.3 The role of equity
In this section, we analyze whether the level of bank equity plays a role in inhibiting the
contagion mechanism pointed out in the previous section. We first state the following
result:
Corollary 2: The optimal individual level of monitoring intensity, mi, and the project’s
success probability, π, are increasing in the level of bank equity Ei.
Proof. See the appendix.
The result stated in Corollary 2 is consistent with the main results in moral hazard
problems: the more skin in the game the agent has, the more effort she will exert in
the project (e.g., Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) The importance of this result here is that
higher equity may curb contagion. We state this result below:
Proposition 4. Bank equity mitigates contagion. The adverse effect of a negative shock to
bank 2 on bank 1’s monitoring incentives and the project’s success probability are decreasing
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where, ∆m1 = m1
benchmark −m1shock.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows: from bank i’s perspective, the health of the
other bank and its own level of equity, Ei, are substitutes in the sense that both lead to
stronger monitoring incentives. The cost of monitoring is convex. Therefore, at higher
levels of equity (when monitoring is already high), the marginal value of the other bank’s
health on monitoring incentives is small. As a result, contagion is less damaging if a bank
is well capitalized. In fact, for a sufficient level of capitalization, a shock to one bank will
not affect the other bank’s incentives to monitor the borrower. We state this result below:
Corollary 3: There exists a threshold Ê such that when a bank’s equity is higher than or
equal to it, E ≥ Ê, its monitoring incentives are not affected when the other bank suffers
a solvency shock.
Proof. See the appendix.
4.4 Robustness: The free-rider problem
The literature in multiple-lending argues that lending to the same borrower may give rise
to a free-rider problem among lenders, in the sense that monitoring can be seen as public
good. We have in mind the situation in which one bank may find optimal to reduce
its contribution to monitoring when the other bank increases it. In terms of our model,
considering free-riding implies that πm1m2 < 0. Under this assumption, if a bank suffers
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a solvency shock and consequently reduces its monitoring intensity, the other bank may
compensate for this reduction by increasing its monitoring intensity, which affects some
of our results. Specifically, it is no longer true that a bank, i, always exerts lower effort if
the other bank, i′, suffers a solvency shock. The effect that a free-riding problem has on
banks’ incentives is opposite to the contagion effect described here. The net effect is an
empirical question and depends on the severity of the free-rider problem.
Below we augment our basic model with free-riding between lenders. For tractability, we
assume a specific form for the combined monitoring intensity. In particular, the combined






2 − γm1m2 (12)
where γ ≥ 0. Free-riding is captured by the term −γm1m2. The parameter γ represents
the severity of the free-rider problem. Notice that γ = 0 returns us to the baseline case
with no free-riding, and γ = 1 brings us to the specification of Carletti et al. (2007).
Using Equation (8), we derive the benchmark case (no shock) symmetric equilibrium in







where α = rII +R− (D + λrLL/2).
When there is a solvency shock to bank 2 (s2 = b), m2 = 0. Using Equation (10), we
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where α′ = rII +R− (D + λrLL).
The contagion effect dominates the free-rider effect if ∆m = m∗benchmark1 −m∗shock1 > 0,
which simplifies as follows:












In this section, we discuss the empirical and regulatory implications of the results derived
in the previous section.
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5.1 Empirical Predictions
The results derived in the previous section suggest at least two effects of multiple lending
on the credit market.
First, multiple lending allows idiosyncratic risks to become systemic by creating a conta-
gion channel. Banking systems more interconnected through shared loans are systemically
riskier. Further, this risk of contagion increases when the shared borrowers are more likely
to face liquidity shocks, such as in times of recessions. Cai et al. (2018) find strong em-
pirical support for this prediction (see also Li and Perez-Saiz, 2018). They show that
banks more heavily interconnected through syndicated corporate loans contribute more to
systemic risk, and the effect is exacerbated during recessions.
Second, contagion via multiple lending creates externalities that undermine the incen-
tives of financial institutions to monitor their borrowers. Banks will exert more monitoring
on borrowers that they share with healthy banks. Since monitoring affects borrowers’ like-
lihood of repayment, more monitoring would result in a lower rate of non-performing loans.
This implies that the rate of non-performing loans of a single bank should vary across bor-
rowers, depending on the equity level of other banks funding these borrowers. We are not
aware of any empirical work that tests this prediction.
5.2 Policy
Bank authorities have been largely concerned about the consequences of systemic risk on
the stability of the financial sector. Different policy measures have been taken, aimed at
minimizing the individual exposures across banks. Our results suggest, however, that not
only are direct links across banks relevant for systemic risk, but also indirect links arising
from common borrowers. In particular, this is due to a decrease in banks’ monitoring
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incentives when one of the co-lending banks is hit by a solvency shock. Since a bank’s
monitoring is unobserved, it is not possible to regulate directly.
There are, however, two possible ways to mitigate the problem. One possible solution
could be a more stringent supervision of those banks sharing borrowers with weak financial
institutions, or higher regulatory provisions for loans granted to borrowers who borrow
from weak banks. The other policy implication comes from the discussion in subsection
4.3, which states that a high enough level of equity inhibits the possibility of contagion
through the monitoring incentive channel. It should be noted that being better capitalized
is not only privately beneficial for a bank, but also socially beneficial in banking systems
that are highly intertwined through common borrowers. The social benefit derives from
the bank equity’s ability to contain spillovers of negative monitoring shocks to connected
banks. Given that banks would not internalize this social benefit of equity, the socially
optimal level of capital would be higher than the bank’s privately optimal level of capital.
This suggests that a regulator should step in and curb this source of contagion by setting
high enough capital requirements.
6 Conclusions
The intertwined nature of the banking sector has been proffered as an explanation for
the spread of risk throughout the system. This view has motivated changes in regula-
tory frameworks and has opened an important debate regarding the sources of financial
contagion.
Our paper contributes to this debate by presenting a new channel through which sol-
vency problems can spread across financial institutions. It shows that multiple-bank lend-
ing can lead to contagion. The channel for the transmission involves the monitoring
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incentives of banks. A solvency shock in one bank undermines the monitoring incentives
of all banks financing the same borrower. The bank that has suffered the solvency shock
has lower incentives to monitor the borrower because it has less to recover after paying
depositors. The bank that has not suffered from the shock has lower incentives to monitor
the borrower because it no longer shares the liquidity risk of the borrower with the other
bank. As a consequence, the bank that has not suffered the solvency shock reacts by
reducing the monitoring intensity for the common borrower.
Our results have a number of implications. First, banks monitor borrowers that they
share with healthy banks more intensely. Second, in order to assess the risk of conta-
gion, the regulator should consider the degree of bank interconnectedness arising from
loan portfolios. This can be addressed either by exerting more stringent supervision to
banks sharing borrowers with weak financial institutions, or by imposing higher regula-




This appendix contains the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4, and Corollaries 2 and 3.
Proof of Proposition 3
In order to compare the equilibrium monitoring intensities in the case of shock and non-
shock, we have to compare the optimal level of monitoring implicitly defined by Equations
(8) and (10). The difference in these equations is given by the term in brackets, so they
can be written as:
πmiα− cmi = 0 (16)
where α corresponds to [R− (D+ λrL(L/2)L/2)] and [R− (D+ λrL(L)L)] for Equations






Notice that [R− (D+ λrL(L/2)L/2)] > [R− (D+ λrL(L)L)]. This is true since L/2 < L
and rL(L/2) < rL(L). Thus, we have that individual monitoring intensities are lower
when one of the banks has been hit by a solvency shock.
Proof of Corollary 2
To prove this corollary, we write Equation (8) as a function of equity, E. To do so, we
establish the relationship between the face value of debt D and the level of equity E:
1 + I = D + E (17)
Plugging the value of D = 1 + I − E into Equation (8), and totally differentiating this
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This implies that individual monitoring intensities are monotonically increasing func-
tions of the level of equity.
Proof of Proposition 4
We need to show that the change in the monitoring intensity of bank 1, due to a shock to




where ∆m = m1
benchmark −m1shock.












































The expression is negative since α > α′.
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Proof of Corollary 3
We know from Corollary 2 that individual monitoring intensities are monotonically in-
creasing functions of the level of equity. Furthermore, individual monitoring intensities
are bounded by 1, i.e., mi ∈ [0, 1], such that π ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, there exists a threshold
Ê, such that for all E ≥ Ê, mi = 1, regardless of the behavior of the other bank.
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